Publications
अनुमितेमानसत्त्वबिचाररहस्यम् (Anumiter Mānasatvavicārarahasyam)
Harirama Tarkavagisa, in this book, examines the proposal that inference could be subsumed under supersensual perception as accepted in Nyāya. Harirama argues that not all cases of inference could be so explained. He imagines all sorts of possible objections to the view that inference, really speaking, is a kind of perception and refutes all these, defending the thesis that inference is to be regarded as an independent source of knowledge.
अवच्छेदकत्वनिरुक्ति: (Avacchedakattvaniruktiḥ)
In this book, Jagadīśa offers commentary on the nature of vyāpti as mentioned by Raghunatha Śiromaṇī in his Didhīti. Jagadīśa talks about two kinds of vyāpakatva in great detail. In this context, Jagadīśa alludes to the concept of avacchedakata and explains these allaying all the possible questions that one could raise in this context.
क्रोड्पत्त्रसंग्रहः (Krodapattrasangraha or Critical Notes)
This book is a collection of short essays by Kāliśankara Siddhāntavāgīsa on different issues in Navya-Nyāya. The essays in the present collection include discourses on Gadādhara’s theory of Prāmāṇya, 2. Gadādhara’s theory of Anumāna, 3. On Vyāptipañcaka, 4. On Siṅhavyāghralakṣaṇa, 5. Gadādhara’s theory of Vyādhikaraṇa, 6. On the Siddhāntalakṣaṇa, 7. Gadādhara’s theory of Anugama of Vyāpti, 8. Gadādhara’s theory of Pakṣatā, 10. Gadādhara’s theory of Avayava, 11. Gadādhara’s theory of Sāmānyanirukti, 12. On Savyabhicara, 13. On Sādharaṇa, 14. On Asādharaṇa and 15. On Satpratipakṣa.
ध्ब्मसजन्यभावयो: कार्यकारणभावरहस्यम् (Dhvaṃsa- Janyabhāvayoḥ Kārya-Kāraṇabhāvarahasyam)
In this essay, Harirama Tarkavagisa undertakes an analysis of the nature of the causal relationship between a positive effect and destruction. The author examines the nature of the inference viz. Dhvaṃsa is due to vināśa. If one takes into consideration this inference, there must be a hetu here and the hetu could be said to have an upadhi viz. Bhāvatva. Harirama, in this context, presents different ways of formulating the causal relation. The author ends this essay by concluding that the positive effect (janyabhāva) could be said to be the cause of destruction (dhvaṃsa) through the relation of pratiyogitva.
पक्षताप्रकरणम् (Pakṣtā Prakaraṇam)
In this book Jagadśa undertakes a study of the concept of pakṣatā. Pakṣatā is regarded as the cause of inference. Some define pakṣatā as sādhyasaṃśaya. Some others define pakṣatā as siṣādhayiṣāvirahaviśiṣtasiddhyabhāvaḥ. A detailed analysis of all these issues has been done by the author in this book.
प्रामाण्यवाद: (Prāmāṇyavādaḥ)
In this book, Harirama Tarkavagisa critically assesses the Mīmāṃśa theory of self-luminosity of knowledge. According to Prabhākara, the knower, the object of knowledge and the knowledge itself are apprehended in one go. The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold that knowledge is inferred through a property called knownness. Murāri Miśra, another Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, holds that knowledge is known in a subsequent knowledge called introspection. Harirāma, following the footsteps of Gaṅgeśa, argues that since sometimes doubt regarding the validity of knowledge arises in the third moment after the origin of knowledge, the validity of the knowledge is apprehended by something other than the totality of the causal conditions of that knowledge. Harirama further argues that there is something wrong with the thesis that knowledge is self-luminious.
प्रामाण्यवाद: (Prāmāṇyavādaḥ)
The original text of Gaṅgeśa, called Tattvacintāmaṇi, has been commented on by both Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and Gadāhara Bhattācārya. If knowledge is gained through the ways of knowing, then the very nature of knowledge rests on the nature and veridicality of these recognised ways of knowing. An examination of the veridicality of the ways of knowing is known as pārāmānya. In this book, both Raghunātha and Jagadīśa offer a detailed analysis of the debate concerning the nature and veridicality of the very idea of pramāṇa.
मुक्तिबादबिचारः (Muktivādavicaraḥ)
This book is an essay on Nyāya theory of liberation. Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa, in this book, critically assesses the generally accepted definition of liberation as permanent (ātyantika) cessation (nivṛtti) of suffering (duhkha). The debate revolves around explaining the terms like ‘atyanta’ and ‘nivṛtti’. Harirama argues that the widely accepted understanding of these words fails to cover all the different kinds of liberation that philosophers talk about. Harirama proposes to describe liberation as the destruction of final suffering and the idea of finality could be understood as a universal inhering in suffering. Harirama argues that if knowledge of reality is to be regarded as the cause of liberation, then liberation is to be regarded as the permanent post-negation of sin and not of misery.
शक्तिबाद (Śaktivādaḥ)
In this book, Gadādhara Bhattāchārya presents a theory of the meaning of words. This work is divided into three chapters: 1. Sāmānyakāṇḍa, 2. Viśesakāṣḍa and 3. Pariśiṣtakāṇḍa. In Sāmānyakaṇḍa, the author undertakes a detailed analysis of vṛtti of words. Here one comes across a definition of śakti in terms of which a word denotes its meaning. The theory of anvitābhidhāna has been refuted. In the Viśeṣakaṇḍa, the author undertakes an analysis of the meaning of words denoting an individual and the meaning of the words denoting a universal. Prabhākara theory of meaning has been refuted. This chapter contains an analysis of indexicals and demonstratives. The third chapter viz. Pariśiṣtakaṇḍa contains a defence of the view that the śakti of a word lies in the individual that is qualified by the corresponding universal. Views of several Mīmāṃsaka philosophers have been critically assessed.
शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Part-1))
In this book Jagadīa Tarkālaṃkāra presents a detailed analysis of various aspects of śabdapramāṇa from the perspective of Navya-Nyāya. The book starts with a critical assessment of the views of Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsaka philosophers with regard to the veridicality of śabda as a pramāṇa. This is followed by a discourse on the nature of meaningful words, the nature of prākṛti, pratya, nipāta. A definition of a sentence is formulated. The relation between word and meaning in its different aspects has been presented. The book ends with a discussion on the nature and different kinds of samāsa.
शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Vol-1))
Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā is an important text written by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra containing an analysis of śabda pramāna following the Navya-Nyāya tradition. This work is a defence of many of the theses of Gaṅgeśa, the author of Tattvacintāmaṇi. In many places, the views of Bhatṛhari and Srīpatidatta, the author of Kalapa-pariśiṣta, have been critically assessed and defended. The author offers a detailed analysis of how the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is generated through the presence of the elements like ākāṁṣkā, yogyatā and āsatti. Since the meaning of a word is defined in terms of śakti, a question arises with regard to the locus of śakti. Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas hold that śakti stays in the universal. Jagadīśa refutes this thesis of the Mīmāṁsakas. The author also refutes the thesis that the locus of śakti is the individual object, a view that is propagated by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. Jagadīśa defends the view that combines both the insights that the locus of śakti is the individual object and the locus of śakti is the universal. In this book, Jagadīśa presents an analysis of the nature of lakṣanā. In this work we also find an analysis of how ākaṁkṣā, yogyatā and āsatti could be treated as the cause of understanding the meaning of a sentence. Jagadīśa, however, refutes the view that the knowledge of tātparya is the cause of understanding the meaning of a sentence, instead proposes the view that prakaraṇajñāna is the cause of understanding the meaning of a sentence. Thus in the present work the author, after defending śabdapramāṇa as an independent pramāṇa, offers his analysis of the ways of generating linguistic understanding.
शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Vol-2))
In the second volume of Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā, Jagadīśa presents a detailed analysis of Prabhākara’s kāryānvitaśaktivāda and refutes this view. Jagadīśa defends the niravacchinna śaktivāda of the words like ākāśa etc. The view of Raghuntha Siromani with regard to the causal nexus of linguistic understanding has been refuted. Jagadisa offers an analysis of the nature of paribhāṣika śabda and argues that proper names given to individuals do not have śakti and they are to be treated as paribhāśaika śabda. Jagadīśa defends the view that śakti resides in all the three loci: the individual, the universal and the relation of samavāya that holds between an individual and the universal. Jagadīśa also refutes the Mīmāṃsaka view that the sentence has lakṣaṇā and the view of Ālaṃkārika regarding the vyāñjanā relation has been rejected. In this book, Jagadīśa offers a detailed analysis of different kinds of lakṣaṇā and in this context, one comes across a criticism of the Prabhākara thesis that the word having lakṣaṇā is not the cause of syntactic knowledge of the sentence. This book ends with an analysis of the nature of yogaruḍa śabda.
शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Vol-3))
The third volume of Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā contains an analysis of samāsa. The book starts with a presentation and analysis of the definition of samāsa in general. Jagadīśa distinguishes nitya samāsa from anitya samāsa. The present work contains an analysis of six kinds of samāsa, viz, 1. Dvigu, 2. Tatpuruṣa, 3. Avyaībhāva, 4. Bahubrīhi, 5. Dvandva. The author accepts another samāsa viz. Upapada. The Grammarians hold that the vigraha vākya and the samasta vākya do not have the same śakti and so the nature of understanding the meaning of the vigraha vākya does not amount to understanding the meaning of the samāsa. Jagadīśa refutes this view of the Grammarian and argues that both the vigraha vākya and the samāsa do possess the same meaning. While the traditional Pāṇinian grammar includes karmadhārāya samāsa in tatpuruṣa samāsa and dvigu samāsa in karmadhāraya samāsa, the Katantra Grammar includes dvigu samāsa in tatpuruṣa samāsa. Jagadīśa intervenes in this debate and holds that karmadhāraya and dvigu are independent samāsas and so he thinks that there are six kinds of samāsas viz. tatpuruṣa, avyaībhāva, bahubrīhi, dvandva, karmadhārāya and dvigu. In this book one finds a detailed analysis of all these six kinds of samāsa. Even if Jagadīśa does not accept upapada samāsa as an independent samāsa, still he offers an analysis of upapada samāsa on behalf of those who accept upapada samāsa.
शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका (Śabdśaktiprakāśikā)
Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā contains six chapters: 1. Nāmaprakaraṇa, 2. Samāsaprakaraṇa, 3. Supvibhaktiprakaraṇa, 4. Kārakaprakaraṇa, 5. Akhyātaprakaraṇa, 6. Taddhitaprakaraṇa. The present volume contains two commentaries on Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā viz. . Kriśnakānti commentary by Krisnakānta Vidyāvāgīśa and Pravbodhinī commentary by Rāmabhadra Siddhāntavāgīśa.
सिद्धान्तलक्षणम् (Siddhānta Lakṣaṇam)
The final definition of vyāpti, known as siddhāntalakṣaṇa, has been explained by Jagadīśa in this work. The final definition of vyāpti is: where pratiyogyasāmānadhikaraṇya tāsāmānādhikaraṇatyantābhāvāpratiyogitāvacchedakabhacchinam does not hold, their vyāpti stays in the same locus. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi comments on this definition of vyāpti. Jagadīṣa further explains this final definition of vyāpti.
